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Abstract The paper is devoted to the presentation and analysis of the philo-
sophical views concerning logic and mathematics of the leading members of Cra-
cow Circle, i.e., of Jan Salamucha, Jan Franciszek Drewnowski and Jo´zef
(Innocenty) Maria Bochen´ski. Their views on the problem of possible applicability
of logical tools in metaphysical and theological researches is also discussed.
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The term ‘Cracow Circle’ is used to describe a group of people who tried to apply
the methods of modern formal/mathematical logic to philosophical and theological
problems, in particular they attempted to modernise the contemporary Thomism
(the trend which was then prevailing) by the logical tools. The group consisted of:
the Dominican Father Jo´zef (Innocenty) M. Bochen´ski,1 Rev. Jan Salamucha,2 Jan
R. Murawski (&)
Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science, Adam Mickiewicz University, ul. Umultowska 87,
61-614 Poznan, Poland
e-mail: rmur@amu.edu.pl
1 Jo´zef (Innocenty) Maria Bochen´ski was born in Czuszo´w (District of Miecho´w) on 30 August 1902. He
began the studies of law in Lvov in 1920. Then he moved to Poznan´ (in 1922) where he studied economy.
However, he did not finish his studies. In 1926, he entered the major theological seminary in Poznan´, and
in 1927, he joined the Dominicans. In the years 1928–1931, he studied philosophy in Fribourg
(Switzerland), where he received his doctor’s degree. In the years 1931–1934, he studied theology at the
Angelicum in Rome—he also obtained his doctorate there. From 1934, he lectured on logic at the
Angelicum. In 1938, he presented his Habilitationsschrift to the Theological Faculty of the Jagiellonian
University in Cracow. During World War II he served as chaplain to the Polish Army and the Polish II
Corps in Italy. In the years 1945–1972, he was a professor at the University of Fribourg. In 1948, he
received the Chair of the History of Modern Philosophy there. In 1958, he founded the Institute of Eastern
Europe at the University of Fribourg. He died in Fribourg on 8 February 1995.
2 Jan Salamucha was born in Warsaw on 10 June 1903. In 1919, he entered the major seminary in
Warsaw, and in 1925 he received the Sacrament of Holy Orders. In 1920, he was a medical orderly in the
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Franciszek Drewnowski3 and the logician Bolesław Sobocin´ski who collaborated
with them. 26 August 1936 is regarded as the foundation date of the Cracow Circle.4
On that day a special meeting was held during the Third Philosophical Congress in
Cracow. The meeting gathered 32 people, including professors of philosophy of the
theological academies and major theological seminaries as well as the future
members of the Circle. It was presided over by the outstanding philosopher and
specialist in Medieval studies Rev. Konstanty Michalski. Another participant was
Jan Łukasiewicz, one of the key representatives of the Lvov–Warsaw School5—
specifically of the Warsaw School of Logic—who himself had dealt with
philosophy and formulated a programme of a radical reform of this domain,
suggesting the use of the methods of modern logic. Łukasiewicz formulated this
programme in the paper ‘O metode˛ w filozofii’ [On Method in Philosophy] (1927).
During the meeting Łukasiewicz, Bochen´ski, Salamucha and Drewnowski
presented their views and then a discussion was held. The proceedings were
published in 1937 in volume 15 of Studia Gnesnensia under the title Mys´l katolicka
wobec logiki wspo´łczesnej [Catholic Thought in Relation to Modern Logic].
In fact, the contacts and collaboration between those who were members of the
Cracow Circle began earlier—cf. Bochen´ski (1989)—and the above mentioned
meeting was rather a public manifestation. According to Bochen´ski the Circle
existed for seven years—from the beginning of his friendship with Salamucha till
the outbreak of World War II.
Footnote 2 continued
Polish-Soviet war. In the years 1923–1927, he studied philosophy, mathematics and mathematical logic at
the University of Warsaw where he listened to the lectures by Jan Łukasiewicz, Stanisław Les´niewski,
Tadeusz Kotarbin´ski, Władysław Tatarkiewicz and Stefan Mazurkiewicz. He obtained his doctor’s degree
in 1927. From 1927 till 1929, he studied at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome. Till 1933, he
lectured on philosophy at the major seminary in Warsaw. In 1933, he completed his habilitation but it was
recognised by the ministry only in 1936. In the year 1934, he also began lecturing at the Jagiellonian
University. In November 1939, he was arrested, together with other professors of the Jagiellonian Uni-
versity, and transported to the concentration camp in Sachsenhausen and from there to Dachau. He was
released in January 1941 and forced his way to Warsaw where he was active in the underground
movement. During the Warsaw Uprising he was a chaplain. He was killed on 11 August 1944.
3 Jan Franciszek Drewnowski was born in Moscow on 2 December 1896. He lived in Warsaw from 1903.
In 1914, he attended technical courses in Warsaw and in 1915 he studied at the Mathematical-Physical
Faculty in Petersburg. In 1916, he completed a course of engineering at the Military School in Petersburg
and served as officer in the Russian army. In 1918, he was drafted into the Polish army and in 1920 he was
an officer of the general headquarters. At the same time, he attended lectures at the Faculty of Finance and
Economics of the School of Political Sciences. In 1921–1927, he studied philosophy, mathematical logic
and mathematics at the University of Warsaw under the supervision of Stanisław Les´niewski, Jan
Łukasiewicz and Tadeusz Kotarbin´ski. In 1927, he obtained his doctor’s degree under Kotarbin´ski’s
supervision. His dissertation concerned Bolzano’s theses on logic. During the defence of Warsaw in 1939
he was an aide-de-camp of the commander of sappers. After the capitulation he was in a German
prisoner-of-war camp until 1945. Then he was in the Polish Forces in Rome and England. He returned to
Poland in 1947. He was an advisor to the minister in the Central Planning Office and a scientific
consultant in the Institute of Economics and Organisation of Industry. He was also an editor of technical
dictionaries. He died in Warsaw on 6 July 1978.
4 Here we cannot give more details about the history of the Cracow Circle—more information on this
theme can be found, for example in Wolak (1993, 1996), cf. Bochen´ski (1989) as well as Wolen´ski
(2003).
5 On the Lvov–Warsaw Philosophical School see Wolen´ski (1989).
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The four people who composed the nucleus of the Circle shared interests in
mathematical logic as well as philosophical and theological issues. Bochen´ski was a
doctor of philosophy and theology; he was a professor at the Angelicum in Rome.
Salamucha studied philosophy, mathematics and mathematical logic at the
University of Warsaw, received his PhD in philosophy at the Jagiellonian
University, studied at the Gregorian University in Rome, and when the Circle
was created he was a professor of philosophy at the Warsaw Major Seminary.
Drewnowski, who was T. Kotarbin´ski’s disciple, was the editor and publisher of
Rocznik Handlu i Przemysłu [Yearly Reports on Trade and Industry] in Warsaw.
Sobocin´ski, a philosopher and logician, was an assistant at the University of
Warsaw, and he dealt mainly with formal logic. As opposed to the first three men he
did not publish any works on philosophy but he participated in all of the meetings of
the Circle and in a way was an expert on logical problems.
The members of the Cracow Circle were fascinated with modern formal logic but
were dissatisfied with the level and way of cultivating philosophical and theological
reflections of their times. Consequently, they proposed a complete axiomatisation
and formalization of the Catholic doctrine, especially Thomism. It should be added
that they all respected Thomism. Salamucha and Bochen´ski regarded themselves as
Thomists. Nevertheless, they wanted to change it and transform it into a normal
scientific theory. They thought that Catholic thinkers were not faithful to their
sources, i.e. scholasticism. Rejecting modern logic they did not follow the spirit of
St Thomas Aquinas who had made use of then existing logical apparatus in his
philosophical and theological analyses. The Circle postulated a reform of
philosophy, first of all its methods and not its content. They did not intend to
give up traditionalistic philosophy but wanted to make it precise and develop it in a
scientific way. Moreover, the representatives of the Circle thought that the new
research methods, using the instruments of modern logic, allowed them to discover
numerous valuable elements in the old philosophical and theological texts. They
were highly critical about the philosophical systems that had originated between the
sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries, including Neo-Scholasticism. Their criticism
focused on the methodology of those systems. In particular, they criticised Hegel’s
philosophy ‘not because it was idealistic, but because it was confused, badly stated
and insufficiently justified’ (Bochen´ski 1989, p. 12). Additionally, the Circle
rejected Neopositivism and all minimalistic philosophies.
As mentioned before, the members of the Cracow Circle were predominantly
concerned with methodological problems. They aimed at reforming the traditional
way of thinking and writing, which characterised Catholic philosophers and
theologians. In addition, they were convinced that modern mathematical logic could
be used in philosophical and theological investigations. As Bochen´ski writes, they
postulated that
(1) the language of philosophers and theologians should exhibit the same
standard of clarity and precision as the language of science; (2) in their
scholarly practice they should replace scholastic concepts by new notions now
in use by logicians, semioticians, and methodologists; (3) they should not shun
occasional use of symbolic language. To put it briefly the Circle wanted to
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persuade catholic thinkers and writers to adopt the ‘‘style’’ of philosophizing
cultivated by the Polish logical school (1989, pp. 11–12).
Łukasiewicz’s influence on the Circle and its programme was obvious. Bochen´ski
writes:
This is not surprising as all the members of the Circle, with the exception of
myself, had been his pupils. His were the methodological postulates, the
criticism of modern philosophy, and the doctrine of the neutrality of logic,
stated explicitly for the first time at a meeting of the Circle in 1934. And again,
the inquiries by some members of the Circle into the ancient and medieval
logic were in fact the continuation of the pioneering work done by
Łukasiewicz (1989, p. 12).
It should be added that the Circle had to face aversion and misunderstanding
shown by the followers of the official theology. Its method, using mathematical
logic, aroused resistance and opposition. The philosophical interpretations formu-
lated by means of this method were accused of anti-metaphysicism, atheism,
conventionalism, relativism, pragmatism, positivism and other opposing views to
Christian doctrine. The use of logical methods was connected—completely
unjustifiably—with the attitude towards religion of such logicians as B. Russell,
T. Kotarbin´ski or the whole Vienna Circle. Refuting these accusations, the
representatives of the Cracow Circle firmly defended the neutrality of mathematical
logic with respect to philosophy. Thus they shared the views of the Lvov–Warsaw
School, opposing the Vienna Circle.
The originality and significance of the conceptions formulated by the Cracow
Circle should be stressed. Later similar attempts were made by individual scientists,
for example Bendiek (1949, 1956) or Clark (1952). However, they worked on their
own account and did not form any group; consequently, their achievements are not
as remarkable as those of the Circle. Bochen´ski thinks that the efforts of the Circle
aiming at changing the Catholic thinkers’ attitude towards modern formal logic
were completely unsuccessful (cf. Bochen´ski 1989, p. 14). One of the reasons was
the tragic death of Salamucha—the soul of the Circle—during World War II.
However, the reasons were more complex. Bochen´ski writes:
The failure of the programme proposed by the Cracow Circle is not due to
some peculiar Polish circumstances. It seems to be the result of the wide-
spread resistance on the part of otherwise rationally thinking philosophers and
theologians to recognize the significance of mathematical logic and analytic
philosophy in any intellectual endeavour.
The case of the Cracow Circle is particularly sad. For Poland is one of among
not so many countries that has had a flourishing school of logic and an
efficient team of catholic scholars, who claimed to be rational. One would
have expected that in such a country a new catholic philosophy and, in the first
place, a new catholic theology should arise. Alas, this has not been the case
(1989, pp. 15–16).
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Nonetheless, despite Bochen´ski’s opinions the efforts of the Cracow Circle were
continued—but not as extensively as one may expect. Besides the aforementioned
works of Bendiek and Clark it is worth recalling the analyses of the five ways of
Thomas Aquinas with the help of the instruments of modern logic undertaken by F.
Rivetti Barbo`, E. Nieznan´ski or K. Policki.6 These authors used the strong tools of
logic like the Kuratowski-Zorn lemma (Policki) or the theory of lattices (Nieznan´ski).
Before proceeding to analysing the philosophical views of the Cracow Circle on
logic and mathematics, we should mention their main achievements as far as the
implementation of the tools of mathematical logic to solve philosophical and
theological problems is concerned. These achievements include:
(1) logical analysis of the proof ‘ex motu’ for the existence of God, presented by
St Thomas Aquinas in his Summa contra gentiles, undertaken by Salamucha
(1934),
(2) formalisation and logical analysis of the proof for the immortality of the soul
given by St Thomas Aquinas, formulated by Bochen´ski (1938),
(3) analysis of the scholastic concept of analogy—these investigations were
initiated by Drewnowski (1934) and Salamucha (1937a), then developed by
Bochen´ski (1948),7
(4) a certain number of works concerning the history of logic, particularly the
history of Medieval logic—these investigations were characterised by looking
at the old logic through the prism of modern logic8—the works of Salamucha
(1935, 1937b) or Bochen´ski’s monograph (1956a), which was to some extent
the culmination of this research trend,
(5) numerous works popularising Christian thought and the new style of its
cultivation.
Our reflection on the philosophical views on logic and mathematics formulated
by the scholars under consideration should begin with the analysis of Salamucha’s
views. Using the methods of logic to analyse the arguments of St Thomas Aquinas,
Salamucha utilized the classical two-valued propositional calculus as well as the
concepts of membership, relation and set. He referred to Principia Mathematica by
Whitehead and Russell; he also used the symbols of their work. So he neither made
use of semantic concepts nor the concept of truth, nor referred to the fundamental
work of Tarski (1933). The aforementioned instruments were sufficient for him.
Formulating his conception of logic he cut himself off from nominalism,
preserving neutrality towards the philosophical problems related to his idea. In
footnote 4 to his work of 1934, he wrote:
Although this way I am adopting much from mathematical logicians, it does
not mean at all that I sympathize with their nominalistic point of view in logic
and materialistic or positivistic tendencies in philosophy. I think that the same
way as within traditional logic grounds different philosophical systems could
6 The analysis of these attempts can be found in Nieznan´ski’s work (1987).
7 For studies on analogy in the Cracow Circle see Wolak (2005).
8 This method was also used by Łukasiewicz—cf. Łukasiewicz (1951).
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occur equally in agreement or disagreement, it happens similarly within
mathematical logic grounds, only in the second case more responsibility is
required (2003).9
On the one hand, he understood logic—according to Koj (1995)—as an objective
science the theses of which were formulated in an objective language and not in the
metalanguage. On the other hand, he treated logic as a formal science and as such, it
could not be placed on any floor of abstraction. Following Aristotle and Thomas, he
saw logic as the science on operating concepts concerning reality and not as a
science on reality alone. Therefore, logic is the science de entibus secundae
intentionis. However, this clearly opposes the objective concept of logic. Salamucha
was aware of this difficulty but did not develop this issue.
These problems appeared because of the question concerning the applicability of
mathematical logic to metaphysical issues. According to the scholastic tradition
mathematical logic is placed on the second level of abstraction whereas philosophy
and in particular, metaphysics, on the third level. Salamucha did not reject this
Medieval classification but sought a solution in the observation that Medieval
mathematics and logic differed from modern mathematics and logic. In his paper ‘O
mo _zliwos´ci s´cisłego formalizowania dziedziny poje˛c´ analogicznych’ [On Possibil-
ities of a Strict Formalization of the Domain of Analogical Notions] (1937a), he
wrote that Medieval mathematics analysed the quantitative characteristics of objects
whereas modern mathematics broke with this approach and ‘for the majority of
modern mathematicians mathematics is simply a deductive theory, in which from
some axioms and definitions derivative theorems are derived with the help of logical
theses, mathematics can contain no empirical elements’10 (2003, p. 79). Thanks to
that mathematics becomes similar to logic and along with the latter can—as noticed
above—be treated as the science dealing with objects of second intention (cf. 1937a,
p. 128). Salamucha adds:
In this way, mathematics has got closer to logic to such an extent that the
boundaries between what has till recently been two branches of sciences,
today slowly disappear and mathematics becomes simply a part of logic, only
higher and deductively later than those parts of the same science which are
commonly regarded as logic (2003, p. 79).11
9 ‘Chocia_z w ten sposo´b zapo _zyczam wiele od logiko´w matematycznych, nie znaczy to wcale, _ze
solidaryzuje˛ sie˛ z ich nominalistycznym nastawieniem w logice i z materialistycznymi czy
pozytywistycznymi tendencjami w filozofii. Mys´le˛, _ze tak samo jak na gruncie logiki tradycyjnej mogły
wyste˛powac´ ro´wnie zgodnie, czy ro´wnie niezgodnie, ro´ _zne systemy filozoficzne, podobnie sprawa sie˛
przedstawia na gruncie logiki matematycznej, tyle, _ze tu obowia˛zuje wie˛ksza odpowiedzialnos´c´’ (1934).
10 ‘dla wie˛kszos´ci wspo´łczesnych matematyko´w matematyka jest po prostu teoria˛ dedukcyjna˛, w kto´rej z
pewnych aksjomato´w i definicji wyprowadza sie˛ przy pomocy tez logicznych pewne twierdzenia
pochodne – _zadnych elemento´w dos´wiadczalnych matematyka zawierac´ nie mo _ze’ (1937a, p. 132).
11 ‘W ten sposo´b matematyka zbli _zyła sie˛ do logiki do tego stopnia, _ze granice mie˛dzy tymi dwiema do
niedawna gałe˛ziami nauk dzis´ powoli sie˛ zacieraja˛ i matematyka staje sie˛ po prostu cze˛s´cia˛ logiki, wy _zsza˛
tylko i dedukcyjnie po´z´niejsza˛ od tych cze˛s´ci tej samej nauki, kto´re powszechnie za logike˛ sa˛ uwa _zane’
(1937a, p. 132).
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He summarises his considerations:
Thus, it appears that the fears that the application of logistic to metaphysics
constitutes a violation of the differences between the traditional degrees of
abstraction, are a result of some misunderstandings. Too great an emphasis has
been laid upon the origin of logistic and modern mathematics has been
confused with medieval mathematics (2003, p. 83).12
In Salamucha’s opinion, logic is a theory of deductive argumentation.
Unfortunately, he did not develop this idea. Therefore, it is not clear—as Koj
writes (1995, p. 20)—‘whether logic should be treated as a theory of consequences
or whether only as metasystemic theses saying which objective theses should be
accepted.’13 However, logic enables us to control reasoning. Reasoning as a mental
activity is not intersubjectively verifiable, but through ordering expressions to
particular elements of reasoning and through the analysis of the operations
conducted on these expressions we can check the conformity of inference with
logical rules. Salamucha spoke here about methodological nominalism. It should be
noted that it is something different than, for example, Chwistek’s nominalism,14
which treats reasoning just as an operation on expressions (devoid of meaning). In
Rev. Salamucha’s opinion logic does not exclude meanings but only temporarily—
exactly for methodological reasons—abstracts from them while analysing the
arguments. Yet, Salamucha stressed that such a conception of logic did not force
nominalism in philosophical theories in which it is utilised.
One of the consequences of such a conception of logic is the thesis that logic is
not creative but only consists in checking the conducted activities (for instance,
reasonings); it allows checking and ordering deduction. At the same time, it is to
some extent a universal science, i.e. its theses can be used in all disciplines.
Salamucha wrote that ‘the normative consequences of logic embrace all fields of
science and even ordinary life if we want it to be at least a little logical’ (1936,
p. 620).15
Salamucha did not claim that the formal logic of his times was a sufficient tool
allowing the analysis and precise reconstruction of the whole of scholastic
philosophy. When asked whether logic was such a sufficient tool he said that he did
not know that. Referring to Principia Mathematica, he claimed that it was sufficient
to construct the whole of mathematics. However, he did not exclude the fact that in
12 ‘Okazuje sie˛, _ze obawy, jakoby zastosowanie logistyki do metafizyki było pogwałceniem ro´ _znic
mie˛dzy tradycyjnymi stopniami abstrakcji, sa˛ wynikiem pewnych nieporozumien´; kładzie sie˛ zbyt wielki
nacisk na pochodzenie logistyki i miesza sie˛ matematyke˛ wspo´łczesna˛ z matematyka˛ s´redniowieczna˛’
(1937a, p. 137).
13 ‘czy logike˛ [nale _zy] traktowac´ jako teorie˛ konsekwencji, czy tylko jako metasystemowe tezy
mo´wia˛ce, jakie tezy przedmiotowe nale _zy przyja˛c´.’
14 On Chwistek’s philosophy of logic and mathematics and in particular on his nominalizm see
Murawski (2011a, b).
15 ‘normatywne konsekwencje logiki obejmuja˛ wszystkie dziedziny naukowe i nawet _zycie potoczne,
je _zeli chcemy, _zeby ono było choc´ troche˛ logiczne.’
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the future it would be necessary to enlarge logic so that we might use it to make
adequate analyses of philosophical problems.16 Salamucha realised that his
investigations and those conducted by the Cracow Circle were something new
and belonged to the domain which had not been developed before. Concluding his
paper ‘O mo _zliwos´ci s´cisłego formalizowania …’ he wrote:
The arguments of this paper resemble forcing one’s way through a jungle,
where man rarely enters; logisticians who are not interested in scholasticism
do not enter there—scholastics who are not interested in logistic do not enter
there (2003, p. 95).17
In Salamucha’s opinion, one of the problems that should be solved and developed
was the issues related to analogy. The adversaries of the Cracow Circle raised the
reservation—because of the use of formal logic in metaphysics—that the latter used
analogous concepts whereas logic aimed at providing precise concepts and making
them unambiguous. Rev. Salamucha did not have a solution for that but he saw that
the concept of analogy, which scholastics used, was vague and pointed to some
ideas of Drewnowski included in his work ‘Zarys programu filozoficznego’ [Outline
of a Philosophical Programme] (1934). Consequently, he formulated the following
interesting opinion:
It seems, however, that in metaphysics an adequately interpreted metalogic is
going to be more useful than modern formal logic itself (2003, p. 94).18
As for the philosophical problems related to mathematics, we should also
consider Salamucha’s opinion that the appearance of non-Euclidean geometries and
the creation of relativity theory allowed us to break down—as he wrote—the
tyranny of time and space. He argued that both concepts were non-empirical and
because of that we could not empirically confirm the influence of time and space on
physical phenomena. Thanks to these new theories, the concept of space became
‘empirically reversed’ and ‘space is only a conceptual construction and this
construction can be undoubtedly and consistently developed in many different
ways’ (1946).19 It is not clear what Salamucha meant by that. Since if geometry is to
be understood as a formal science, experience does not play any role in recognising
its theorems as true or rejecting them as false. Both types of geometry—Euclidean
and non-Euclidean—have the same epistemological status in this conception.
However, if this or that geometry is used to construct physical models, experience
16 This need was also presented clearly by Bochen´ski when he tried to formulate certain aspects of the
problem of universals using the terms of modern logic—cf. Bochenski (1956b). He claimed that logical-
mathematical investigations concerning certain questions connected with the problem of universals might
require stronger logical and semantic tools than those that were available at that time.
17 ‘Wywody tego artykułu sa˛ troche˛ takie, jak przedzieranie sie˛ przez ga˛szcze, gdzie rzadko wdziera sie˛
człowiek; nie wchodza˛ tam logistycy, kto´rych scholastyka nie interesuje, – nie wchodza˛ tam scholastycy,
kto´rzy nie zajmuja˛ sie˛ logistyka˛’ (1937a, p. 152).
18 ‘Zdaje sie˛ jednak, _ze w metafizyce bardziej przydatna oka _ze sie˛ metalogika, odpowiednio tylko
interpretowana, ani _zeli sama wspo´łczesna logika formalna’ (1937a, p. 151).
19 ‘dos´wiadczalnie wywracane’; ‘przestrzen´ jest tylko konstrukcja˛ poje˛ciowa˛ i mo _zna te˛ konstrukcje˛
konsekwentnie i bezsprzecznie na ro´ _zne sposoby rozbudowywac´.’
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will play a fundamental role here and will determine the adequacy of the description
provided by the given model.
Finally, our reflection on Salamucha’s views should include his praise of Roman
Ingarden’s criticism of the philosophy of the Vienna Circle and his answer to the
question of using formal logic in phenomenology. Salamucha agrees with Ingarden
to some extent, writing:
If one claims, together with Prof. Ingarden, that all and only those issues
belong to philosophy which concern either (a) ‘‘pure possibilities or necessary
relations between possibilities’’ or (b) ‘‘the real existence of all possible
domains of being’’ and ‘‘the real essence of both entire domains of being and
their particular elements’’, where the main stress is laid upon the subject (a),
then one will have to accept – at most with some small reservations – that the
methods of particular sciences, and hence also the deductive method, will have
no application to philosophy (2003, p. 84).20
However, this would lead—according to Salamucha—to a radical reduction of
philosophical problems. Yet, if one wants to cultivate Thomistic philosophy and
theology, the utilisation of logistic tools is fully justified.
Let us proceed to the views concerning logic of another member of the Cracow
Circle Jan F. Drewnowski. He formulated a more refined philosophical conception
than the other members did—cf. his ‘Zarys programu filozoficznego’ [Outline of a
Philosophical Programme] (1934), which became a kind of manifesto of the Cracow
Circle although the other members of the Circle referred to it rather loosely.
Drewnowski—as opposed to Salamucha or Bochen´ski—did not follow Thomism
but chose his own way. In addition, he was an expert in natural sciences. His
philosophical programme was based on the interdependence of various fields of
science, especially logic, natural sciences, mathematics and theology.
Drewnowski’s aim was to propose a new philosophical language that could be
used to express the views of many different philosophers, in particular the theses of
modern scientific philosophical theories and the theses of classical philosophy,
including Thomism.
One of the important components of Drewnowski’s programme was his theory of
signs. In his opinion, signs play a substitutive role, allowing us to get to know the
real world by going beyond direct sensations and by creating systems.21 However,
we should expect to face here certain threats, which Drewnowski specified in
‘Zarys’:22
20 ‘Je _zeli sie˛ przyjmie, razem z prof. Ingardenem, _ze do filozofii nale _za˛ te wszystkie zagadnienia i tylko
te, kto´re dotycza˛: (a) czystych mo _zliwos´ci lub koniecznych zwia˛zko´w mie˛dzy mo _zliwos´ciami lub
(b) faktycznego istnienia wszelkich mo _zliwych dziedzin bytu i faktycznej istoty zaro´wno całych dziedzin
bytowych jak i ich poszczego´lnych elemento´w, przy tym gło´wny nacisk poło _zy sie˛ na tematach a, to – co
najwy _zej z pewnymi małymi zastrze _zeniami – trzeba be˛dzie uznac´, _ze metody nauk szczego´łowych, a
wie˛c i metoda dedukcyjna, nie znajda˛ w filozofii zastosowania’ (1937a, p. 139).
21 One can say that Drewnowski has ancitipated in a way some of the ideas of Jacques Derrida.
22 All of the quotations come from ‘Zarys programu filozoficznego,’ included in Drewnowski’s
collection of selected works Filozofia i precyzja [Philosophy and Precision] (1996).
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Falling into a habit of constant intercourse with signs instead of reality itself,
meaning – so to say – an intentional attitude towards reality, causes in the long
run that the sense of this intentionality is blurred (1996, p. 58).23
On the one hand, identifying signs with reality can reduce reality to what the signs
define and on the other hand, can recognise what the signs give as some new domain
of reality.24
At first, signs substitute the reality under consideration and then help in
theoretical considerations, which leads to the so-called pile-up of signs, i.e. groups
of signs are replaced by other signs. Not paying attention to this problem may lead
to a misunderstanding. Additionally, one should distinguish between signs and the
instructions describing how to use these signs.
Drewnowski distinguished three kinds of theories: scientific, mathematical and
theological. All of them are systems of signs. Drewnowski formulated rules of using
signs for each kind of these theories and reflected on the relationships between the
theories.
Having presented the general remarks we can proceed to discussing Drewnow-
ski’s views on mathematics and logic as well as the applicability of logic to other
sciences. Let us begin with his remarks on axioms and definitions. He claims that:
Axioms are either expressions of certain presumptions of the so-called laws that
are binding in a given domain or they are only expressions of certain agreements
accepted within a given notation. In both cases they do not express anything
absolute: in the first case – it is more correct to formulate them as suitable
conditions and put them in an abbreviated way in the antecedents of the theorems
of a theory25; in the other – they belong to regulatory instructions, and it is more
correct to formulate them as appropriate directives (1996, p. 67).26
Drewnowski views definitions in a similar way.
In Drewnowski’s approach mathematical theories are ‘the same sign mechanisms
as other theories of natural sciences’ (1996, p. 71).27 He describes them more
precisely in ‘Zarys’:
Their characteristics are that they are tools to analyse scientific theories
themselves and all other systems of signs that look like scientific theories.
23 ‘Przyzwyczajenie do cia˛głego obcowania ze znakami zamiast z sama˛ rzeczywistos´cia˛, czyli taki – _ze
tak powiem – intencjonalny stosunek do rzeczywistos´ci, sprawia na dalsza˛ mete˛ zatarcie sie˛ poczucia tej
intencjonalnos´ci.’
24 Twardowski also warned against this kind of errors (cf. his ‘Symbolomania i pragmatofobia’
[Symbolomania and pragmatophobia], 1927). In turn, Łukasiewicz recommended a constant contact with
reality while using developed philosophical systems.
25 We are dealing here with the theorem of deduction—remark is mine.
26 ‘Aksjomaty sa˛ wyrazem ba˛dz´ pewnych przypuszczen´ co do obowia˛zuja˛cych w danej dziedzinie tzw.
praw, ba˛dz´ te _z tylko sa˛ wyrazem pewnych umo´w przyje˛tych w obre˛bie danego znakowania. I w jednym, i
w drugim wypadku nie wyra _zaja˛ niczego bezwzgle˛dnego: w pierwszym – poprawniej jest sformułowac´ je
jako odpowiednie warunki i w skro´cony sposo´b wymieniac´ je w poprzednikach twierdzen´ teorii; w
drugim wypadku – nale _za˛ do instrukcji wykonawczej, i poprawniej jest sformułowac´ je jako odpowiednie
dyrektywy.’
27 ‘sa˛ takimi samymi mechanizmami znakowymi, jak inne teorie przyrodnicze.’
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They deal only with the properties of the construction of the systems of signs
occurring in theories, namely the dependence of various structural types of
complex signs on the ways of using them, in accordance with the regulatory
instructions of a given theory. […] Therefore, the only type of operations on
mathematical theories is the operations that mark the deduction of proposi-
tions and similar inter-propositional relations (1996, pp. 71–72).28
What is the relation of the commonly understood mathematics towards the
mathematical theories thus characterised? Drewnowski claims that some parts of
mathematics are scientific theories, in particular the arithmetic of natural numbers
based on the primary concepts of quantity and sign. Natural theories include, in
Drewnowski’s opinion, ‘all geometries if they concern some extensive properties
and do not move to generalisations, dealing with any relations of which a special
case is a given relation occurring in some empirical extension’ (1996, p. 73).29 The
remaining part of ‘contemporary mathematics can probably be comprised in the so-
called theory of relations, i.e. it will depend on what I call here mathematical
theories’ (1996, p. 73).30 In addition, for a mathematical theory it does not matter
what the signs signify, and consequently, ‘the propositions of mathematics are
devoid of any definite meaning’ (ibid.).31 The identification of mathematics with
mathematical theories leads to the thesis that ‘objects with which mathematics deals
are arbitrary human creations’ (ibid.).32 The problem of existence of mathematical
objects can be reduced to the existence of signs which a given theory uses—as
opposed to the scientific theories ‘where the indispensible condition of correctness,
the verifiability of arguments, will always be to indicate the way of making
available to the analysis what the theory is about’ (1996, p. 74).33
According to Drewnowski, such mathematical theories include all the general-
isations of philosophy and the whole part of metaphysics dealing with general laws.
However, he regards the incompetent mathematisation of various domains as
wrong. At this point, it results from the schematisation of mathematical domains
‘which do not know the dependencies that modern mathematics investigates’ or
attempts ‘to transfer only mathematical symbols to various considerations, e.g.
historical-philosophical ones, by those who do not know mathematics’ (1996,
28 ‘Charakterystyczna˛ cecha˛ ich jest to, _ze sa˛ narze˛dziami do badania samych teorii przyrodniczych i
wszelkich innych układo´w znako´w, wygla˛daja˛cych jak teorie przyrodnicze. Zajmuja˛ sie˛ one wyła˛cznie
włas´ciwos´ciami budowy układo´w znako´w wyste˛puja˛cych w teoriach, mianowicie tym, jak uzale _znione sa˛
ro´ _zne typy strukturalne znako´w zło _zonych od sposobo´w posługiwania sie˛ nimi, zgodnie z instrukcjami
wykonawczymi danej teorii. […] Jedynym wie˛c typem operacji na gruncie teorii matematycznych sa˛ te,
kto´re znacza˛ wywiedlnos´c´ zdan´ i pokrewne zale _znos´ci mie˛dzyzdaniowe.’
29 ‘wszelkie geometrie o tyle, o ile zajmuja˛ sie˛ jakimis´ własnos´ciami rozcia˛głymi, a nie przechodza˛ do
uogo´lnien´ zajmuja˛cych sie˛ dowolnymi stosunkami, kto´rych szczego´lnym przypadkiem bywa dany
stosunek wyste˛puja˛cy w jakiejs´ rozcia˛głos´ci dos´wiadczalnej.’
30 ‘wspo´łczesnej matematyki da sie˛ prawdopodobnie obja˛c´ tzw. teoria˛ stosunko´w, czyli nale _zec´ be˛dzie
do tego, co nazywam tu teoriami matematycznymi.’
31 ‘zdania matematyki sa˛ pozbawione okres´lonego znaczenia.’
32 ‘twory, kto´rymi zajmuje sie˛ matematyka, sa˛ dowolnymi wytworami ludzkimi.’
33 ‘gdzie zawsze niezbe˛dnym warunkiem poprawnos´ci, sprawdzalnos´ci wywodo´w be˛dzie wskazanie
sposobu udoste˛pniania badaniu tego, o czym mowa w teorii.’
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p. 75).34 The starting point of the correct mathematisation of a theory must be
suitable scientific theories based on empirical data—Drewnowski includes here
‘colour or tactile qualities serving as the starting point to construct the notions of
physics, such as the sensations of pain, fear, adoration, the sense of ownership, of
rightness, etc., which can serve as the starting points of many different scientific
theories’ (1996, p. 76).35 Such theories can then be mathematised. Drewnowski
describes this process as follows:
It will consist in that: as the given scientific theory is being developed, its
dependencies are getting more and more complicated; it will be stated that
such dependencies are special relations, worked on in the mathematical
theories. Then the whole part of a proper mathematical theory can be used in
the given scientific theory by substituting the signs of the dependences
occurring in the scientific theory, which are special relations, analysed in the
mathematical theory, in the correct theorems of the mathematical theory. And
reversely – various new dependencies in the given scientific theory can incline
us to generalise them and thus provide new problems to the mathematical
theories (1996, p. 76).36
Drewnowski regards the features of the mathematical theories as the advantages and
benefits of this mathematisation, writing:
The value of this mathematisation of knowledge will occur even more clearly
when on the one hand, it is considered that the mathematical theories owe their
efficiency to their higher degree of generality: analysing the dependencies,
without considering their meanings, allows making many attempts and
modifications, which would not be easy within the framework of some
scientific theory in which the meanings of signs, many a time loaded with
tradition, habits, hinder the movements (1996, p. 76).37
34 ‘kto´rym obce sa˛ te zale _znos´ci, jakimi zajmuje sie˛ wspo´łczesna matematyka’; ‘przenoszenia samych
tylko symboli matematycznych do ro´ _znych rozwa_zan´, np. historiozoficznych, przez osoby nie znaja˛ce
matematyki.’
35 ‘jakos´ci barwne lub dotykowe, słu _za˛ce za punkt wyjs´cia do budowy poje˛c´ fizyki, jak doznania bo´lu,
strachu, uwielbienia, poczucia własnos´ci, słusznos´ci itp., moga˛ce słu _zyc´ za punkty wyjs´cia szeregu
innych teorii przyrodniczych.’
36 ‘Be˛dzie to polegac´ na tym, _ze w miare˛ rozwijania sie˛ danej teorii przyrodniczej, komplikacji
wyste˛puja˛cych w niej zale _znos´ci, stwierdzac´ sie˛ be˛dzie, i _z pewne takie zale _znos´ci sa˛ szczego´lnymi
przypadkami stosunko´w, opracowywanych w teoriach matematycznych. Wo´wczas cała ta cze˛s´c´
odpowiedniej teorii matematycznej mo _ze byc´ zastosowana do danej teorii przyrodniczej droga˛
podstawienia w odpowiednich twierdzeniach teorii matematycznej znako´w tych zale _znos´ci teorii
przyrodniczej, kto´re sa˛ szczego´lnymi przypadkami stosunko´w badanych w teorii matematycznej.
Odwrotnie te _z – ro´ _zne nowe zale _znos´ci w danej teorii przyrodniczej moga˛ skłaniac´ do uogo´lniania ich i
dostarczac´ w ten sposo´b nowych zagadnien´ teoriom matematycznym.’
37 ‘Wartos´c´ tak poje˛tego matematyzowania wiedzy wysta˛pi jeszcze wyraz´niej, gdy sie˛ zwa _zy, _ze z jednej
strony teorie matematyczne zawdzie˛czaja˛ swoja˛ sprawnos´c´ wie˛kszej swej ogo´lnos´ci: zajmowanie sie˛
zale _znos´ciami, bez ogla˛dania sie˛ na ich znaczenie, pozwala na dokonywanie wielu pro´b i przero´bek, kto´re
nie byłyby łatwe w obre˛bie jakiejs´ teorii przyrodniczej, gdzie znaczenia znako´w, obarczone nieraz
tradycja˛, nawykami, utrudniaja˛ swobode˛ rucho´w.’
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On the other hand, considering the possible applications of the mathematical
theories allows us to choose from ‘a surplus of possible combinations’ those which
are more desired.
Drewnowski also considered the problem of applying symbolic logic, especially
to philosophy. He wrote a special paper on this question in 1965, referring to D.
Hilbert and W. Ackermann’s Grundzu¨ge der theoretischen Logik (1928), which—as
he notices—characterises the method of this application of logic. He describes the
method in the following words:38
The method establishes constant symbols, expressing the specific notions of a
given domain, and describes the types of objects marked by the arguments of
these new functional symbols. With the help of these new symbols and the
symbols of functional calculus,39 the symbolic formulations of the premises
from the given domain are provided. The formulated premises are added to the
axioms of functional calculus as new axioms. From this, using the rules of
inference of functional calculus, we receive theorems, being the symbolic
formulations of what we want to prove in the given domain (Drewnowski
1996, p. 199).40
At the same time, he notices that such an application of the predicate calculus is not
an interpretation of the symbols of the language of this calculus because ‘all the
time these symbols are used in the same general logical meaning as in the classical
logical calculus’ (1996, pp. 199–200).41 The symbolic formulation of the assumed
properties of the analysed objects in the form of axioms can feature certain general
dependencies in a given domain, and the axioms ‘do not have to use up semantically
the content of the notions and all the dependencies of this domain’ (1996, p. 200).42
Such an application of the logical tools to define precisely the given domain of
knowledge does not violate the richness of its content. The application of these tools
is possible to the extent that ‘the rational cognition of the given domain of reality’
(1996, p. 200)43 is possible. Moreover, Drewnowski clearly opposes the view that
symbolic logic cannot be used outside of mathematics, in particular in philosophy.
He criticises the arguments formulated by the followers of this standpoint,
especially the opinions presented by the adherents of the so-called existential
38 Like in the case of ‘Zarys programu filozoficznego’ the page numbering is from Drewnowski’s
selected works Filozofia i precyzja (1996).
39 The old name of the predicate calculus—remark is mine.
40 ‘Metoda ta polega na tym, _ze ustala sie˛ nowe symbole stałe, wyra _zaja˛ce swoiste poje˛cia danej
dziedziny, i opisuje sie˛ rodzaje przedmioto´w oznaczonych przez argumenty tych nowych symboli
funkcyjnych. Za pomoca˛ tych nowych symboli oraz symboli rachunku funkcyjnego podaje sie˛
symboliczne sformułowania przesłanek z danej dziedziny. Tak sformułowane przesłanki doła˛cza sie˛ do
aksjomato´w rachunku funkcyjnego jako nowe aksjomaty. Sta˛d zas´, stosuja˛c reguły wnioskowania
rachunku funkcyjnego, otrzymuje sie˛ twierdzenia, be˛da˛ce symbolicznymi sformułowaniami tego, czego
sie˛ chce dowies´c´ w danej dziedzinie.’
41 ‘symbole te cały czas sa˛ u _zyte w tym samym ogo´lnologicznym znaczeniu, jakie maja˛ w klasycznym
rachunku logicznym.’
42 ‘nie musza˛ wyczerpywac´ znaczeniowo tres´ci poje˛c´ i wszelkich zale _znos´ci tej dziedziny.’
43 ‘rozumne poznanie danej dziedziny rzeczywistos´ci.’
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Thomism who claim that ‘metaphysics cultivated in this spirit has separate methods
of reasoning, and symbolic logic cannot be used here’ (1996, pp. 200–201).44 This
problem was already considered by Ajdukiewicz in ‘O stosowalnos´ci czystej logiki
do zagadnien´ filozoficznych’ [On Applicability of Pure Logic to Philosophical
Questions] (1934). He asked whether modern logic, which was extensional, could
be used to solve philosophical problems formulated in the intentional colloquial
language. In the aforementioned paper (1965), Drewnowski analysed three
meanings of extensionality and stated that equivalential extensionality of classical
logical calculus was not an obstacle to using this calculus in philosophy. He also
explained how to use logic to solve philosophical and theological problems in the
works of the Cracow Circle:
All of our attempts neither interpreted logical symbols nor translated
metaphysics into the language of symbolic logic. The method of applying
symbolic logic, which we have utilised, was just […] the application of the
very classical logical calculus, to which new constant symbols are added
(1996, pp. 203–204).45
Let us proceed to the last member of the Cracow Circle—Fr Jo´zef (Innocenty)
Maria Bochen´ski. At this point, a certain problem is the evolution of his
philosophical views. Since Bochen´ski was a follower of Kant, and then of neo-
Thomism. He attempted to modernise the latter by using the tools of mathematical
logic. Finally, he departed from the problem of being and moved towards analytic
philosophy. Since our paper concerns the pre-war period we are not going to analyse
his post-war views but focus on his activities in the Cracow Circle (however, we
will sometimes refer to his later activities).
According to the Cracow Circle, if Thomism wants to be a rational philosophy—
which it has been since the very beginning—it must know and use modern formal
logic. This logic gives precision, which Bochen´ski understood in the following way:
Our way of speaking is called ‘precise’, when it observes the following rules:
As far as words are concerned, they must be unequivocal signs of simple
things, features, experiences, etc.; they are to be clearly defined in relation to
these simple signs, in accordance with precisely stated rules. Furthermore,
these words should be always used in such a way that each one of them
constitutes a part of a proposition, i.e. expression that is true or false. Where
propositions are concerned, they cannot be accepted until we know exactly
what they mean and why we assent to them. Sometimes we accept them as
evident, sometimes on the basis of faith or proof – in the latter case it should
44 ‘metafizyka uprawiana w tym duchu ma odre˛bne metody rozumowania i logika symboliczna nie daje
sie˛ tu stosowac´.’
45 ‘Oto´ _z wszystkie te nasze pro´by nie były ani interpretowaniem symboli logicznych, ani przekładaniem
metafizyki na je˛zyk logiki symbolicznej. Metoda stosowania logiki symbolicznej, jaka˛ sie˛ posługiw-
alis´my, była włas´nie […] stosowaniem samego tylko klasycznego rachunku logicznego, do kto´rego
dodaje sie˛ nowe symbole stałe.’
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be conducted on the basis of clearly formulated and efficient logical directives
(1937, pp. 28–29).46
Additionally, precise speaking and thinking should be characterised by the use of
formal logic and exclusion of such irrational factors as will, emotion, imagination.
Bochen´ski was convinced that the best available logic is mathematical logic (formal
logic, logistic)—cf. for example (1936)—but later he thought that certain
philosophical problems required richer logical tools.
After the war, he rejected Thomism and followed analytic philosophy, being
faithful to the discussed metaphilosophical principle and stressing the question of
the method. Doubting whether one exact philosophical system, embracing all
philosophical issues, could be built he analysed unconnected problems separately,
always using exact logical methods.
Refuting the accusations that were made during the discussion at the aforemen-
tioned meeting of the Cracow Circle in Krako´w in August 1936, Fr Bochen´ski paid
attention to the necessity of distinguishing between formal logic and philosophy as
well as to the fact that in antiquity there had been logical systems different from
Aristotle’s logic. Similarly, in logistic it is the classical two-valued logic that plays a
fundamental role. At the same time, formal logic does not focus so much on the
truth of conclusions deduced by applying logical tools—it is the task of other
sciences—but on the truth of its theses. He also stressed the possibility of using
many-valued logics in theology. These logics could be treated as the logics of
probability and utilised to evaluate the degrees of falsity—this may allow us to
realise the idea of St Thomas Aquinas. Moreover, Bochen´ski claimed that the
process of constructing logical systems did not assume any philosophical
presumptions—logic is and should be neutral. The fact that mathematical logic
grew out of mathematics, and like mathematics it uses symbolic notation, does not
mean that formal logic can be used only in mathematics. It can and should be used
wherever deduction is used—the deduction should be always exact and accurate.
When Bochen´ski cultivated philosophy in the spirit of analytic philosophy, he
used the broadly understood logic, embracing formal logic as well as semiotics,
which was based on it, and the general methodology of sciences. In his opinion, this
conception of logic is an ideal pattern of rationality; it provides notional tools to
analyse complex argumentations and to analyse notions. It constitutes the organon
of philosophy and being a kind of ontology it constitutes a branch of philosophy.47
46 ‘S´cisłym nazywamy sposo´b mo´wienia, w kto´rym obowia˛zuja˛ naste˛puja˛ce zasady: Jes´li chodzi o u _zyte
słowa, maja˛ one byc´ ba˛dz´ niedwuznacznymi znakami prostych rzeczy, cech, doznan´ itp., ba˛dz´ te _z byc´ na
gruncie poprawnie sformułowanych dyrektyw za pomoca˛ takich włas´nie znako´w jasno zdefiniowane.
Słowa te maja˛ byc´ dalej u _zyte zawsze tak, by ka _zde z nich stanowiło cze˛s´c´ zdania, to jest wyra _zenia, kto´re
jest prawdziwe albo fałszywe. Jes´li chodzi o zdania moga˛ one byc´ uznane dopiero wtedy, gdys´my sobie w
pełni zdali sprawe˛, co znacza˛ i dlaczego je uznajemy. Racja˛ tego uznania be˛dzie niekiedy oczywistos´c´,
niekiedy wiara, niekiedy dowo´d – w ostatnim przypadku ma on byc´ przeprowadzony na gruncie jasno
sformułowanych i sprawnych dyrektyw logicznych.’
47 Bochen´ski wrote in (1980): ‘‘In fact [modern logic] deals with ‘ultimate foundations’ and it consists of
axiomatic study of most abstract properties of any objects. Just therefore Heinrich Schulz claimed—
rightly as it seems—that modern logic is an ontology being a fundamental part of philosophy.’’
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According to Bochen´ski modern logic is an autonomous science—but not only
this kind of logic. In fact, in every epoch a highly developed logic had the right to be
characterised as autonomous (cf. his paper of 1980). Asked whether modern logic is
a mathematical discipline or whether it should be included in philosophy he answers
(1980) that it depends on the definitions of mathematics and philosophy. If
mathematics is defined through its method, logic, using the same method and having
the same characteristics (symbolic, formalistic, deductive, objective, etc.) as the
mathematical sciences, should be regarded as a mathematical discipline. As a matter
of fact, the boundaries between modern logic and mathematics are blurred.
However, logic has two features that distinguish it from mathematics. The first one
is the maximal generality of its fundamental branches such as propositional
calculus, predicate calculus or the logic of relations and the second is its higher
degree of exactness (cf. Bochen´ski 1980, Section VI). On the other hand, assuming
that philosophy analyses the foundations and most general properties of objects,
modern logic, as any logic, becomes part of philosophy (ibid., Section VII). This
thesis is also supported—in Bochen´ski’s opinion—by the fact that modern logic has
given solutions to many traditional philosophical problems. He mentions Russell’s
conception of logical paradoxes and his theory of systematic ambiguity. This is—
according to Bochen´ski—a solution of the eternal problem of the ‘univocity of
being’. Further he mentions Tarski’s definition of truth as well as Go¨del’s first
incompleteness theorem. He claims that the latter has shown among other things
that there are no philosophical systems that could embrace the whole of reality (like
Hegel’s system). Thus logic, as a tool of philosophy, is also its part. This is also
possible when logic is a part of mathematics, which results from—according to
Bochen´ski—the fact that it is the most general and fundamental part of
mathematics. It seems—he adds—that ‘‘the same truths are obligatory in the
fundamental parts of all sciences’’ (Bochen´ski 1980, Section VII).
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